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place to undertake a searching examination of the philosophical ele-
ments in the orthodox doctrine of naturalistic evolution. But then 
where may the intellectual case against naturalistic evolution be 
fairly considered? Nothing in the Constitution prevents universities 
from providing a forum for dissent, including theistic dissent from 
naturalistic evolution. The only problem is to overcome the preju-
dice which makes so many intellectuals identify naturalism with 
reason itself, and which causes them to accept uncritically Darwin-
ist assurances that any dissenters must either be ignorant of the evi-
dence or misunderstand "how science works." 
CONSTITUTIONAL BRINKMANSHIP: AMENDING 
THE CONSTITUTION BY NATIONAL CONVENTION. 
By Russell L. Caplan. 1 New York: Oxford University Press. 
1988. Pp. xxii, 240. $27.00, cloth. 
Richard S. Kay 2 
Two or three years ago people began to notice that thirty-two 
state legislatures bad filed petitions requesting Congress to call a 
national convention to propose an amendment to the Constitution 
requiring a balanced budget. This number was (and remains) two 
short of the two-thirds of the states that article V specifies as neces-
sary to mandate such a convention. For many commentators a sec-
ond national constitutional convention seemed uncomfortably 
imminent. The Washington Post called it "a terrible idea" that 
would "be a mess--and could threaten our structure of government 
and guaranteed liberties."3 The New York Times said a convention 
would be "fraught with the danger of runaway revision."4 
This reaction was nothing new. The convention method of 
proposing amendments bas never been used. Each time we have 
come anywhere close, the same kind of alarm has warded it off. 
In this book, Russell Caplan bas provided the first modem 
scholarly volume on the national constitutional convention contem-
plated in article V. It is an extremely useful addition to the litera-
ture of constitutional change. Caplan approaches the subject in two 
parts. In the first he examines the history of the "constitutional 
convention," from its origins in seventeenth century England to the 
1. Attorney, United States Department of Justice. 
2. Professor of Law, University of Connecticut. 
3. Wash. Post, May 9, 1988, at A14, col. 1. 
4. N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1987, at A24, col. 1. 
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American conventions of the revolutionary and constitution-mak-
ing eras, to the more or less regular attempts to secure a convention 
for a variety of purposes and the reactions to those attempts. In the 
second part he addresses a series of disputed legal questions con-
cerning a convention, should it ever be called or meet. These in-
clude the content, form and timing of state applications, the 
regulatory or reviewing power of Congress or the courts, and the 
breadth of the powers permitted to the convention itself. 
The interest these questions hold is related to the general fear 
such conventions have inspired in modem observers. In particular, 
critics have worried that a convention called to consider one type of 
amendment might decide to open up the whole Constitution for re-
vision. It may become a "runaway convention." Such an event, it 
is argued, would be a profound threat to the individual rights pro-
tected in the Constitution, especially in the Bill of Rights and the 
fourteenth amendment. Caplan notes that the more serious recent 
attempts at an article V national convention have been aimed at 
limiting income taxes, stopping school desegregation and busing, re-
serving legislative apportionment decisions to the states, restricting 
abortion, and balancing the federal budget. The threat from a "run-
away" convention, therefore, seems not so much to constitutional 
rights plainly embedded in the constitutional document, as to a se-
ries of judicial decisions whose connection to the text or history of 
the Constitution is, at best, profoundly controversial. Even the 
most recent drive for a convention to propose a balanced budget 
amendment received significantly more attention in the wake of the 
decision in Bowsher v. Synars holding invalid the Gramm-Rudman 
budget scheme. 
The uneasiness about a new constitutional convention, there-
fore, has on its face a certain anti-democratic aspect. A convention 
would not jeopardize the existing Constitution understood as some 
particularly important act of the "people." It would endanger a set 
of rules and doctrines created by judges in the distinctly anti-
majoritarian process of constitutional litigation. Even the original 
Constitution, created by a narrow class of people now long dead, 
can hardly compete with a freshly elected convention in democratic 
legitimacy. The competition in that regard between a new conven-
tion and the "non-originalist" law of the Supreme Court is even 
more one-sided. 
The potential impact of a convention on constitutional law de-
pends, of course, on exactly what the delegates might be able to do. 
Caplan thinks that limits can be placed on the convention's 
5. 478 u.s. 714 (1986). 
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agenda.6 He argues that state applications may, and possibly must, 
specify specific subjects for amendments. Those subjects define the 
Convention's legitimate field of deliberation. Congress, on the other 
hand, is strictly limited in the degree to which it may interfere with 
the form or content of Convention proceedings. It may prescribe 
"housekeeping" matters such as the time and place of the meeting 
or the apportionment or qualifications of members. But it may not 
specify the necessary majorities for convention action or when the 
convention must adjourn. 
Caplan contends, moreover, that these and many other alloca-
tions of authority are judicially enforceable. In the first instance 
Congress may enforce its idea of the convention's limits by refusing 
to submit its proposals to the states. But a state could challenge 
that refusal in court and "[i]f the reason offered by Congress for 
nonselection [of a means of ratification] was that the amendment 
was nonconforming, quite possibly the court would make the deter-
mination itself, and if it upheld the amendment, direct Congress to 
choose a mode and submit the measure for ratification." Likewise 
if the convention tried to bypass Congress's role in submitting the 
measure to the states "Congress would be able to obtain an injunc-
tion to prevent enforcement . . . . " 
These rather definite declarations are supported with a wide 
array of material. Caplan reasons from the language of article V 
itself. He cites the actions and debates of the Philadelphia Conven-
tion of 1787 and the ratification debates. He relies, as well, on 
precedents from state constitutional conventions and state court 
judgments relating to those conventions. He refers to learned trea-
tises and law review articles. That is, his conclusions are supported 
by the same kinds of materials we would expect to find in an appel-
late brief. This form of argument, the certainty with which he 
states his positions and his expectation that courts would have the 
last word, all seem to assume that the nature of a national constitu-
tional convention turns on the application of rules and principles of 
law. 
The correctness of that assumption, however, is one of the 
most interesting questions connected with constitutional conven-
tions. The doubt that such a convention is amenable to legal re-
straint underlies the great wariness with which convention 
proposals are greeted. In his historical discussion Caplan shows 
6. Compare Van Altyne, Does Article V Restrict the States to Calling Unlimited Con-
ventions Only-A Letter to a Colleague, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1295 (subject matter of convention 
may be limited) with Dellinger, The Recurring Question of the "Limited" Constitutional Con-
vention, 88 YALE L.J. 1623 (1979) (contra). 
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how often proposals for a convention have been opposed precisely 
because they were so likely to be unlimited by any law. The most 
illustrious example is of course the adoption of the Constitution of 
1787-89. The Philadelphia Convention had no license in law for its 
existence. It exceeded the boundaries set for its work by the Conti-
nental Congress and in the states' commissions to their delegates. 
Congress had limited it to suggesting revisions and alterations to the 
Articles of Confederation. Instead it drafted a profoundly new 
charter. As Caplan explains, the proposed Constitution became law 
after a process of ratification that was plainly at odds with the Arti-
cles' own requirements for amendment. 1 
All this was justified at the time by the claim that the approval 
of the state ratifying conventions invested the Constitution with a 
political legitimacy that overcame any defect of law. The founding 
generation understood those state conventions to be capable of ex-
pressing the endorsement of the sovereign people in whose hands 
any constitution, any law was "clay in the hands of the potter."s 
The sanction of the people, wrote Madison in The Federalist No. 40, 
would "blot out antecedent errors and irregularities. "9 
Constitutions ordinarily cannot be the creatures of the law. 
They provide the basis for all other law but they themselves rest on 
no legal basis. Their authority is necessarily political. The constitu-
tional convention is the most convincing institutionalization of that 
unincorporated and ill-defined, but critical, political authority. The 
people who call such conventions and the people who react to them, 
may well regard them as outside and above the law. In response to 
an argument that the 1821 New York constitutional convention was 
limited in the revisions it could effect, one delegate announced: 
"Sir, we are standing upon the foundations of society. The elements 
of government are scattered around us." 10 
The idea that the constitutional convention has powers supe-
rior to any form of positive law is apparent in assemblies bearing 
that name as far back as the seventeenth century. When the pow-
ers-that-were decided to terminate the protectorate of Richard 
7. See Kay, The Illegality of the Constitution, 4 CoNST. CoMM. 57 (1987). For an 
argument that the Constitution was legally adopted see Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, SS V. 
CHI. L. REV. 1043 (1988). 
8. Wilson, Lectures on Law, in I THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 375 (J. Andrews ed. 
1896). 
9. THE FEDERALIST No. 40, at 253 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). 
10. Caplan devotes a few pages in his preface to this persistent "convention-as-sover-
eign notion" and also notes that legal restrictions cannot as naturally be applied to conven-
tions that propose whole new constitutions (like the Philadelphia Convention) than to those 
that merely propose amendments. On the whole, however, his arguments presume the exist-
ence of an applicable and binding law. 
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Cromwell and invite back Charles II in 1660, they wished, as much 
as circumstances allowed, to revert to procedures authorized under 
the law of England as it existed before the Civil War. A body was 
elected that was very like a Parliament but could not in law be a 
Parliament because it was not summoned by the king. While this 
group called itself a Parliament the legal defect caused it to be 
known popularly as a mere convention.u Similarly in 1688-89, af-
ter the invasion of William of Orange and the flight of James II, the 
assembly that offered the throne to William and Mary could not be 
a Parliament because it was convened by William who was not yet a 
king. It too became known as a convention.12 In the same period 
irregular assemblies in many of the colonies were also called con-
ventions. These conventions, in other words, were defined by the 
presence of legal flaws. But they did things that no legally assem-
bled body could have done. A member of the Commons House of 
the 1688-89 Convention vainly reminded his colleague that "Parlia-
ments that are Called by Kings, cannot make Kings, much less can 
a Convention not Called by a King .... "13 
Remarkably, the very thing that made the convention-assem-
blies improper, their nonconformity with existing law, was what in-
vested them with special authority. They appealed not to the law 
but to the source ofthe law's power. In 1688-89, although the Con-
vention itself was deliberately ambiguous as to the legality of its 
actions, some pamphleteers, at least, suggested that the Convention, 
reflecting the sense of the people, was under no limitations. One 
suggested that it "seemeth to be something greater, and of greater 
power, than a Parliament."l4 
Likewise the fact that the eighteenth century American con-
ventions were conceptually separate from any ordinary legislature 
came to be seen as their greatest virtue. Indeed Hamilton argued 
that it was the Articles of Confederation whose legitimacy was sus-
pect because they proceeded from no source more fundamental than 
the legislatures. He wished to lay "the foundations of our national 
11. See Jameson, The Early Political Uses of the Word Convention, 3 AM. HlST. REv. 
477, 481-82 (1898). Jameson also notes a number of earlier uses of the term "convention" in 
connection with "a parliament of defective or imperfect legality." ld. at 482-84. 
12. Jd. at 479; E. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEoPLE: THE RisE OF POPULAR SoVER· 
ElGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 107 (1988). 
13. Quoted in H. NENNER, BY CoLOUR OF LAW 175 (1977). 
14. Coplan quoting Jameson, supra note 11, at 479 n.3 which itself quotes A Brief Col-
lection of Some Memorandums: or. Things Humbly Offered to the Consideration of the Mem-
bers of the Great Convention and of the Succeeding Parliament (1689). See also R. 
AsHCRAFT, REVOLUTIONARY PoLmCS AND JOHN LocKE'S Two TREATISES OF GoVERN-
MENT 566-68 (1986); E. MORGAN, supra note 12, at 107-10. 
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government deeper ... . "1s When the propriety of initiating a new 
Constitution by such an irregular procedure was raised in Phila-
delphia, Gouvernor Morris felt no embarrassment in replying that 
the argument "erroneously supposes we are proceeding on the basis 
of the Confederation. This convention is unknown to the 
Confederation." 16 
Such precedents, of course, might not be applicable to a na-
tional convention called under article V. Those other conventions 
were anomalies in the existing legal system. They had no law to 
justify their actions. An article V convention, on the other hand, 
might be very much the creature of existing law. It would owe its 
existence, and presumably its powers, to the Constitution of 1787.•7 
It is much easier to see it as subject to rules inferred from article V. 
But this characterization is not inevitable. The creators of article V 
may have contemplated something like the Philadelphia Conven-
tion or the ratifying conventions which were not themselves 
provided for by law. Caplan notes that the advocates of the conven-
tion-proposal method wanted to provide a route of constitutional 
change that did not depend on initiation by the congress--one that 
bypassed the ordinary institutions of government. The drafters of 
the Confederate constitution thought it necessary in their article V 
to provide explicitly that a constitutional convention could only 
consider the amendments proposed by the petitioning states. Even 
if they contemplated a limited convention, the enactors had the ex-
perience of Philadelphia before them. They must have understood 
that it was impossible to be certain what a convention might do or 
how effective it might be. 
H.L.A. Hart elaborated the idea of a rule of recognition that 
provides criteria for the validity of all law in a legal system. He 
emphasized that such a rule is, itself, a rule of law when viewed 
from inside the legal system. It is, however, when considered from 
a viewpoint ·external to the legal system, also the expression of a 
social and political fact.•s No feature of American constitutional 
law more vividly illustrates the dual character of the basis of a legal 
system than the convention feature of article V. It may be an in-
stance of the law expressly recognizing the non-legal facts on which 
15. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 152 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). 
16. M. FARRAND, 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CoNVENTION OF 1787, at 92 (1911). 
17. "The constitutional convention, then, I consider as an exotic domesticated in our 
political system, but in the process so transformed as to have become an essentially di1rerent 
institution from what it was as the Revolutionary Convention." J. JAMESON, A TREATISE 
ON CoNSTITUTIONAL CoNVENTIONS: THEIR HISTORY, POWERS AND MODES OF PROCEED-
ING 15 (1887). 
18. H. HART, THE CoNCEPT OF LAW 108 (1961). 
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all law depends (in this case the supposed approval of the people) 
and the possibility that those facts may change. The provision for a 
convention may be likened to a window looking out of the neat fa-
miliar legal system onto the untamed and unknowable political 
wilds.I9 
This basic ambiguity about the nature of the national conven-
tion of article V has, of course, never had to be resolved because 
such a convention has never met. Judicial treatment of state consti-
tutional conventions has been conflicting. Sometimes challenges to 
the actions of such conventions have been treated no differently 
than cases involving the powers of a public utilities commission or 
any other agency created by and limited by law.2o But other courts 
have treated these conventions as sui generis and, if not exactly free 
from all legal constraints, certainly not subject to ordinary law.2I A 
review of the history of state conventions22 compels the conclusion 
that those bodies are regarded as subject to law when they fail (for 
whatever reason) to get their projects adopted. They are treated as 
above the law when their extra-legal actions are accepted and take 
root. It is impossible to discover, as Caplan tries to do, by consider-
ation of precedents and abstract principles, what a new federal con-
vention may or may not do.23 Only after the dust has settled will 
we know which side of the window the convention was on.24 The 
old doggerel about treason is entirely apt: 
Treason doth never prosper, what's the reason? 
For if it prospers, none dare call it Treason.2S 
No matter how far they transgress existing rules, successful 
19. See I. JAMESON, supra note 17, at 11. 
20. See, e.g., State ex rel Kvaalen v. Graybill, 159 Mont. 190, 496 P.2d 1127 (1972). 
See also In Re the Constitutional Convention, 14 R.I. 649, 654 (1883). 
21. See, e.g., Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. 20, 74 (1793) (opinion of Tucker, J.); Stander v. 
Kelley, 433 Pa. 406, 250 A.2d 474 (1969) cert. denied sub nom. Lindsay v. Kelley, 315 U.S. 
827 (1969). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a challenge to the actions of the 1968 
constitutional convention was justiciable and it could decide whether amendments proposed 
by the convention and approved in a referendum were "violations of the existing Constitu-
tion." 433 Pa. 406 at 412, 250 A.2d 474 at 478-79. It further held that the procedures and 
restrictions that applied to the express constitutional method of amending did not apply to 
convention proposals. /d. at 416-21, 250 A.2d 474 at 479-81. 
22. In addition to Caplan's book this history is reviewed in R. HOAR, CoNSTITU-
TIONAL CoNVENTIONS: THEIR NATURE, POWERS, AND LIMITATIONS (1917 reprinted 
1987) and J. JAMESON, supra note 17. 
23. See R. HOAR, supra note 22, at 46-48 (discussing the Massachusetts convention of 
1853 and judicial reaction to it). 
24. See Taylor v. Commonwealth, 101 Va. 829, 831 (1903); Miller v. Johnson, 92 Ky. 
589 (1892). 
25. Harrington, Epigrams IV.5. (1612) (quoted in THE OXFORD ENGLISH DicriONARY 
Ti-Tz 304 (1933)). 
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constitutional conventions, like those of 1787-89, are unlikely to be 
perceived as outlaws. If they prosper, they will be founders. 
A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION. By 
Daniel A. Farber1 & Suzanna Sherry.2 St. Paul, Minn.: West 
Publishing. 1990. Pp. xxii, 458. $23.25 paper. 
William M. Wiecek 3 
The flourishing condition of legal history in American law 
schools and history departments has produced a spate of valuable 
documentary collections for use in the classroom. These are of in-
calculable benefit to teachers of legal history. Farber and Sherry's 
History of the American Constitution joins this corpus of teaching 
books, and a welcome addition it is. 
The earlier documentary compilations for classroom use in 
legal history, including those by Max Radin,• Mark DeWolfe 
Howe,s Joseph H. Smith,6 and Spencer L. Kimball,' reflected as-
sumptions about the teaching of legal history courses in law schools 
that seem outmoded today. They seldom distinguished between 
public and private law, and they included both English and Ameri-
can materials. They were Langdellian casebooks, doctrinal in em-
phasis, containing little that was not derived from published 
appellate opinions. They reached far back into English history to 
trace the origins of doctrines or precedents but made little effort to 
provide non-legal historical background or explanatory material 
that would embed legal documents in the larger social matrix. They 
were indifferent to modern American legal developments. 
The preeminent modern documentary compilation, Smith and 
I. Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. 
2. Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. 
3. Congdon Professor of Public Law and Professor of History, Syracuse University. 
4. M. RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ANGLo-AMERICAN LEGAL HiSTORY (1936) (a student 
hornbook). 
5. M. HOWE, READiNGS IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY (1949). Howe's collection, 
like its other pioneering contemporary, HART AND SACKS' LEGAL PROCESS, was never con-
ventionally published; it was photocopied from typescript, printed on less-than-print-quality 
paper stock, and issued as a "temporary edition." Fortunate the law library that possesses a 
copy today! Howe's collection was distinguished by its sensitivity to historical context and its 
partial transcendence of the doctrinal. 
6. J. SMITH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL INSTITU-
TIONS (1965). 
7. S. KIMBALL, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES AND 
MATERIALS (1966). 
